Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mapping the Mind', 'The Causal Theory of Names' and 'My Philosophical Development'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


51 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R]
The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R]
Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R]
In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R]
Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R]