43 ideas
| 11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 4913 | Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R] |
| 12697 | Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts [Leibniz] |
| 4910 | Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R] |
| 4911 | The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG] |
| 11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 4919 | There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R] |
| 4908 | No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R] |
| 4902 | Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R] |
| 4904 | Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R] |
| 4915 | In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R] |
| 4917 | Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R] |
| 4916 | There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R] |
| 4905 | Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R] |
| 4918 | In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R] |
| 4912 | Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R] |
| 11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 4903 | Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R] |
| 4920 | Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R] |
| 4906 | Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R] |
| 4909 | The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R] |
| 4914 | A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R] |
| 11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
| 4907 | The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R] |