54 ideas
4913 | Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R] |
4910 | Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R] |
4911 | The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG] |
4919 | There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R] |
20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
4908 | No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R] |
4902 | Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R] |
4904 | Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R] |
4915 | In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R] |
4917 | Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R] |
4916 | There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R] |
4905 | Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R] |
4918 | In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R] |
4912 | Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R] |
4903 | Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R] |
4920 | Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R] |
4906 | Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R] |
4909 | The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R] |
4914 | A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R] |
20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
4907 | The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R] |
6004 | The cardinal virtues are theoretical (based on knowledge), and others are 'non-theoretical' [Hecato, by Dorandi] |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |