37 ideas
| 4913 | Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R] |
| 4910 | Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R] |
| 4911 | The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG] |
| 4919 | There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R] |
| 4908 | No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R] |
| 4902 | Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R] |
| 4904 | Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R] |
| 4915 | In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R] |
| 4917 | Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R] |
| 4916 | There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R] |
| 4905 | Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R] |
| 4918 | In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R] |
| 4912 | Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R] |
| 4903 | Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R] |
| 4920 | Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R] |
| 4906 | Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R] |
| 4909 | The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R] |
| 4914 | A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R] |
| 20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 4907 | The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R] |
| 8412 | A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards [Salmon] |
| 8413 | Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous [Salmon] |
| 8411 | Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon] |