Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Action, Intention and Reason', 'An Argument for the Identity Theory' and 'Mental Content'

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15 ideas

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis]
'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]