Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Epistemology: contemporary introduction', 'The Same F' and 'Material Constitution'

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32 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
16065 Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
16067 Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
16069 There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
16068 The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
12155 Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry]
16074 Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
2730 Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
2715 Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
2735 Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
2736 We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2722 Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
2721 If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
2727 Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
2728 The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
2716 To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
2717 How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2720 Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
2719 Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
2718 Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
2741 The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]
2729 Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
2725 To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
2724 I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
2731 Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
2739 Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
2732 Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
2733 It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
2734 A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
2738 Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
2740 A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
2737 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
2726 We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]