40 ideas
1627 | Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine] |
1623 | Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine] |
15957 | Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle] |
9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |
17783 | A number is not a multitude, but a unified ratio between quantities [Newton] |
17738 | Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine] |
19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
15965 | Boyle attacked a contemporary belief that powers were occult things [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
16735 | In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau] |
1628 | If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine] |
16034 | Form is not a separate substance, but just the manner, modification or 'stamp' of matter [Boyle] |
15953 | To cite a substantial form tells us what produced the effect, but not how it did it [Boyle] |
10929 | Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine] |
12188 | Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge] |
15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
9383 | Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine] |
12424 | Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher] |
9338 | Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine] |
9337 | Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich] |
9340 | Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine] |
15962 | Boyle's term 'texture' is not something you feel, but is unobservable structures of particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
15964 | Boyle's secondary qualities are not illusory, or 'in the mind' [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
1629 | Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine] |
1620 | Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine] |
19488 | The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo] |
1625 | Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine] |
15960 | Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us [Boyle] |
1626 | It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine] |
7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
1621 | Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine] |
9371 | Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine] |
1622 | Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine] |
9366 | Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian] |
14473 | Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson] |
7321 | The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine] |
8803 | Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine] |
17737 | The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins] |
1624 | If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine] |
15952 | The corpuscles just have shape, size and motion, which explains things without 'sympathies' or 'forces' [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |
15972 | The corpuscular theory allows motion, but does not include forces between the particles [Boyle, by Alexander,P] |