9 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
6455 | Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey] |
6454 | Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey] |
6453 | Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
20444 | If paintings could be perfectly duplicated, it would be a multiple art form [Currie, by Bacharach] |