25 ideas
6259 | Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne] |
6263 | No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne] |
6258 | Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
6262 | We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne] |
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
6260 | Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne] |
6261 | The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne] |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |