Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity', 'Foundations of Geometry' and 'Reflections on Value'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23881 All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
23885 Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
23886 Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
23884 Truth is a value of thought [Weil]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10053 Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
10052 Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
23882 Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
23883 Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil]