9 ideas
| 21855 | Only in the 1780s did it become acceptable to read Spinoza [Lord] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 21866 | Hobbes and Spinoza use 'conatus' to denote all endeavour for advantage in nature [Lord] |
| 22040 | Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel] |
| 22039 | Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |