18 ideas
16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
14797 | Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce] |
14798 | All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce] |
16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |