16 ideas
14600 | Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J] |
14603 | 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J] |
14607 | T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
14604 | If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J] |
14599 | Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J] |
14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
14601 | Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J] |
14606 | Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |