9 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
10414 | Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
10415 | Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
2854 | Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B] |
2856 | Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B] |