17 ideas
9540 | A 'value-assignment' (V) is when to each variable in the set V assigns either the value 1 or the value 0 [Hughes/Cresswell] |
9541 | The Law of Transposition says (P→Q) → (¬Q→¬P) [Hughes/Cresswell] |
9543 | The rules preserve validity from the axioms, so no thesis negates any other thesis [Hughes/Cresswell] |
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
9544 | A system is 'weakly' complete if all wffs are derivable, and 'strongly' if theses are maximised [Hughes/Cresswell] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
15150 | The properties of an electron can't be explained just as 'clustering' [Chakravartty on Boyd] |
15149 | Properties cluster together, either because of intrinsic relations, or because of an underlying process [Boyd, by Chakravartty] |