9 ideas
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
1490 | You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture [Nagel] |