22 ideas
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
18052 | An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
14718 | An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |