Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reference and Necessity', 'Rechnungsmethoden (dissertation)' and 'The Epistemology of Essentialist Claims'

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18 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
18256 Quantity is inconceivable without the idea of addition [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
9831 Geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms [Frege]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
14637 Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14636 Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael]
14640 Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14638 Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
14639 Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael]