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All the ideas for 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity', 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws)' and 'Metaphysics: an introduction'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
18859 Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
18861 Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18866 Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18860 A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
18863 What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
13733 Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
9874 Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
18252 Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
18271 We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
10623 Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
9975 Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
18165 My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18864 The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
18865 Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9190 A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
13665 Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
18862 Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant]