25 ideas
| 18951 | For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam] |
| 18953 | Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam] |
| 18949 | The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam] |
| 18952 | '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam] |
| 18958 | In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam] |
| 18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
| 18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
| 18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
| 18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
| 18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
| 18959 | Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
| 18957 | Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam] |
| 18950 | Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam] |
| 10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
| 18960 | Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam] |
| 2181 | It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B] |
| 2176 | There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B] |
| 4317 | We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham] |
| 2174 | Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B] |
| 2178 | In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B] |
| 2169 | Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B] |
| 2172 | The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B] |
| 2179 | If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B] |
| 2180 | If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B] |
| 2175 | There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B] |