9 ideas
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
13074 | Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
7563 | The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley] |
1515 | Pythagoreans believe it is absurd to seek for goodness anywhere except with the gods [Iamblichus] |