9 ideas
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 4303 | The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
| 4306 | For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham] |
| 16746 | Principles of things are not hidden features of forms, but the laws by which they were formed [Newton] |