10 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
12900 | How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach] |
12901 | If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach] |
12902 | Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
4053 | If it is desirable that a given patient die, then moral objections to killing them do not apply [Rachels] |
4052 | It has become normal to consider passive euthanasia while condemning active euthanasia [Rachels] |