16 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
13331 | Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K] |
13332 | Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K] |
13333 | The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K] |
13326 | A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K] |
13327 | A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K] |
13329 | An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K] |
13330 | An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K] |
13328 | Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
17527 | Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
17528 | The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird] |
17526 | The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird] |