Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterparts and Identity', 'Things and Their Parts' and 'Philosophy of Chemistry'

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24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Thick mechanisms map whole reactions, and thin mechanism chart the steps [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
Using mechanisms as explanatory schemes began in chemistry [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Lavoisier's elements included four types of earth [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
Over 100,000,000 compounds have been discovered or synthesised [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
Water molecules dissociate, and form large polymers, explaining its properties [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
It is unlikely that chemistry will ever be reduced to physics [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
Quantum theory won't tell us which structure a set of atoms will form [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
For temperature to be mean kinetic energy, a state of equilibrium is also required [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
'H2O' just gives the element proportions, not the microstructure [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Isotopes (such as those of hydrogen) can vary in their rates of chemical reaction [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Mendeleev systematised the elements, and also gave an account of their nature [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]