21 ideas
7719 | European philosophy consists of a series of footnotes to Plato [Whitehead] |
10656 | With 'extensive connection', boundary elements are not included in domains [Whitehead, by Varzi] |
15389 | In Whitehead 'processes' consist of events beginning and ending [Whitehead, by Simons] |
16235 | Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
14753 | The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider] |
16072 | 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
14751 | Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider] |
16071 | Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
16234 | Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
13278 | Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki] |
14750 | Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider] |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
15247 | Whitehead held that perception was a necessary feature of all causation [Whitehead, by Harré/Madden] |
16962 | Whitehead replaced points with extended regions [Whitehead, by Quine] |