9 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
12354 | A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin] |
12358 | Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin] |
12346 | Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
9141 | Abstraction theories build mathematics out of second-order equivalence principles [Cook/Ebert] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |