10 ideas
| 21238 | Later phenomenologists tried hard to incorporate social relationships [Bakewell] |
| 21237 | Phenomenology begins from the immediate, rather than from axioms and theories [Bakewell] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 19480 | Process philosophy places the dynamic nature of being at the centre of our theories [Seibt] |
| 19479 | Reductionists identify processes by their 'owner', but tornadoes etc. are processes without owners [Seibt] |
| 19481 | Traditionally small things add up to processes, but quantum mechanics reverses this [Seibt] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |