Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reference and Necessity', 'The Journals of Kierkegaard' and 'Philebus'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Fixed ideas should be tackled aggressively [Kierkegaard]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophy can't be unbiased if it ignores language, as that is no more independent than individuals are [Kierkegaard]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato]
If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If people marry just because they are lonely, that is self-love, not love [Kierkegaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato]
The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato]
The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato]
Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato]
Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato]
It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato]
If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato]
A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Our destiny is the highest pitch of world-weariness [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Life may be understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards [Kierkegaard]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
The best way to be a Christian is without 'Christianity' [Kierkegaard]
We need to see that Christianity cannot be understood [Kierkegaard]