Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity', 'Contextualism Defended' and 'Reply to Fifth Objections'

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16 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes]
Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes]