18 ideas
3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
21962 | Metaphysics is the roots of the tree of science [Descartes] |
3659 | I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth [Descartes] |
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
3657 | Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty [Descartes] |
3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |
3660 | Atheism arises from empiricism, because God is intangible [Descartes] |