12 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
21558 | 'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell] |
21559 | We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |