43 ideas
15801 | Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm] |
15802 | I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm] |
13010 | In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine] |
9002 | Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine] |
13681 | Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider] |
13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
9003 | Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine] |
9004 | If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine] |
15832 | Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm] |
15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
15830 | Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm] |
15827 | Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm] |
15804 | If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm] |
9006 | Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine] |
15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
15814 | A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm] |
12852 | If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons] |
15808 | A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm] |
12851 | Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons] |
15806 | The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm] |
15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
9001 | Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine] |
14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
15819 | Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm] |
15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
15831 | Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm] |
15811 | I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm] |
15815 | Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm] |
15813 | People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm] |
15803 | Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm] |
15821 | Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm] |
15824 | There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm] |
15822 | The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm] |
15823 | Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm] |
15820 | A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm] |