49 ideas
6575 | Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin] |
6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
6585 | Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin] |
6557 | Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin] |
6568 | A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin] |
6560 | The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin] |
6565 | The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin] |
6574 | Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin] |
6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
6576 | My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin] |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
6589 | Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin] |
6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
6596 | For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin] |
6597 | A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin] |
6588 | Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin] |
6590 | Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin] |
6583 | Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin] |
6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
6555 | We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin] |
6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
6605 | Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin] |
6607 | The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin] |
6604 | Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin] |
6586 | Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin] |
6572 | Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin] |
6573 | Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin] |
17402 | Mendeleev saw three principles in nature: matter, force and spirit (where the latter seems to be essence) [Mendeleev, by Scerri] |
17399 | Elements don't survive in compounds, but the 'substance' of the element does [Mendeleev] |
17400 | Mendeleev focused on abstract elements, not simple substances, so he got to their essence [Mendeleev, by Scerri] |
17401 | Mendeleev had a view of elements which allowed him to overlook some conflicting observations [Mendeleev] |