Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Walking the Tightrope of Reason', 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' and 'The Art of Rhetoric'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


78 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin]
Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin]
A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
(λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins]
Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins]
To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle]
Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle]
All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin]
Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle]