74 ideas
6575 | Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin] |
15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
6585 | Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin] |
6568 | A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin] |
6557 | Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin] |
6560 | The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin] |
6565 | The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin] |
15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
6574 | Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin] |
14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
17807 | To study formal systems, look at the whole thing, and not just how it is constructed in steps [Curry] |
15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
17806 | It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry] |
17808 | Saying mathematics is logic is merely replacing one undefined term by another [Curry] |
15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
6576 | My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin] |
6589 | Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin] |
6596 | For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin] |
6597 | A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin] |
6588 | Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin] |
6590 | Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin] |
6583 | Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin] |
14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
6555 | We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin] |
14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
6605 | Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin] |
6607 | The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin] |
6604 | Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin] |
6586 | Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin] |
6572 | Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin] |
6573 | Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin] |
14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |