121 ideas
| 16604 | Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau] |
| 16606 | Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau] |
| 16586 | The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau] |
| 16568 | Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau] |
| 16653 | Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau] |
| 16704 | In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau] |
| 16605 | After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau] |
| 16607 | Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau] |
| 16715 | Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau] |
| 16610 | Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau] |
| 16781 | The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau] |
| 15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
| 6575 | Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin] |
| 6585 | Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin] |
| 6557 | Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin] |
| 6568 | A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin] |
| 6560 | The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin] |
| 6565 | The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin] |
| 16677 | Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau] |
| 15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
| 6574 | Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin] |
| 15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
| 15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
| 15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
| 15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
| 15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
| 15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
| 15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
| 15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
| 15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
| 15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
| 15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
| 15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
| 15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
| 15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
| 15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
| 15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
| 15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
| 15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
| 15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
| 15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
| 15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
| 15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
| 15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
| 15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
| 15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
| 15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
| 15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
| 15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
| 15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
| 15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
| 15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
| 15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
| 15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
| 15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
| 15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
| 15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
| 15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
| 15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
| 15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
| 16598 | Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau] |
| 16727 | In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau] |
| 15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
| 15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
| 15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
| 16732 | 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau] |
| 16733 | 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau] |
| 16662 | The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau] |
| 16767 | There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau] |
| 16788 | Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau] |
| 16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |
| 16649 | Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau] |
| 16785 | If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau] |
| 16680 | Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau] |
| 16628 | Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau] |
| 16617 | Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau] |
| 16741 | Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau] |
| 16777 | If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau] |
| 16615 | Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau] |
| 16775 | For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau] |
| 16769 | If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau] |
| 16602 | Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau] |
| 16612 | Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau] |
| 16613 | Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau] |
| 16747 | Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau] |
| 16759 | Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau] |
| 16748 | Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau] |
| 16671 | Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau] |
| 16579 | There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau] |
| 16596 | A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau] |
| 16584 | If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau] |
| 16580 | A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau] |
| 16749 | Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau] |
| 16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |
| 16583 | Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau] |
| 6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
| 15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
| 6576 | My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin] |
| 6589 | Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin] |
| 6596 | For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin] |
| 6597 | A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin] |
| 6588 | Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin] |
| 6590 | Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin] |
| 6583 | Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin] |
| 16783 | Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau] |
| 6555 | We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin] |
| 15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
| 6605 | Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin] |
| 6607 | The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin] |
| 6604 | Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin] |
| 6586 | Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin] |
| 6572 | Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin] |
| 6573 | Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin] |
| 16609 | Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau] |
| 16603 | In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau] |
| 16592 | Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau] |
| 16750 | If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau] |
| 16722 | Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau] |
| 16760 | Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau] |
| 16581 | Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau] |
| 16642 | Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau] |