Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics'', 'Non-Monotonic Logic' and 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19115 You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19081 Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics
19119 We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 12. Non-Monotonic Logic
19111 Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli]
19114 Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli]
19113 Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli]
19116 Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli]
19117 We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli]
19118 People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
19110 In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli]
19112 Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
16629 By comparing qualities and features, reason can gradually infer the nature of substance [Grosseteste]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
8806 The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
8252 Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
8255 Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
8805 Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
18703 Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]