54 ideas
| 12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
| 11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna] |
| 11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna] |
| 11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna] |
| 11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna] |
| 11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna] |
| 11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna] |
| 11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna] |
| 12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
| 11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna] |
| 11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna] |
| 11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna] |
| 12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
| 11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna] |
| 11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna] |
| 12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
| 12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
| 12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
| 11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
| 12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
| 12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
| 12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
| 12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
| 12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
| 12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
| 11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna] |
| 12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
| 11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna] |
| 11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna] |
| 11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna] |
| 10269 | Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam] |
| 12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
| 12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
| 12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
| 12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
| 12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
| 12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
| 12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
| 12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
| 12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
| 11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna] |
| 11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna] |
| 11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna] |
| 11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna] |
| 11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna] |
| 11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna] |
| 11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna] |
| 11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna] |
| 11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna] |
| 11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna] |
| 11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna] |
| 11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna] |