Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Rationality and Logic', 'Freedom and Reason' and 'Things and Their Parts'

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
11051 Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
11054 Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
11070 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna]
11071 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna]
11088 We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
11059 Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
11089 Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13331 Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
11058 Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna]
11072 Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
11061 Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
11063 Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
11055 Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
13332 Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333 The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326 A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
13327 A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329 An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
13330 An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328 Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11083 A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
11086 Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
11084 Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11085 Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
11077 Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna]
11080 Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna]
11078 Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
11053 Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
11081 Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
11082 Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
11067 Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna]
11068 One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna]
11047 Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna]
11048 Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna]
11046 Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
11045 Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
22331 Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
22484 Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
6449 The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel]