91 ideas
24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
14508 | A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM] |
14511 | There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM] |
24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
12031 | Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM] |
12034 | If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM] |
14510 | Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM] |
16455 | Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM] |
14507 | Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM] |
11964 | Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar] |
16451 | Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
11901 | Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P] |
14512 | Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM] |
5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
12032 | Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM] |
24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
7222 | It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill] |
4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
7214 | Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill] |
7212 | Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill] |
7210 | The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill] |
7227 | It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill] |
7228 | Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill] |
7230 | Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill] |
20515 | Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
7229 | People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill] |
7211 | Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill] |
7231 | The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill] |
7217 | The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill] |
7213 | Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill] |
20517 | Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
20516 | Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill] |
7215 | True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill] |
7218 | Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill] |
7221 | Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill] |
7223 | Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill] |
7220 | Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill] |
7219 | Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill] |
7226 | Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill] |
7224 | We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill] |
7225 | It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill] |
1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |
7216 | The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill] |