Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Actualism and Thisness', 'Letters to Jourdain' and 'works'

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11 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
10153 In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19141 Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10048 There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10694 Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall]
10479 Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
8447 In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
8448 Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
10157 Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
16463 Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
8446 We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
8449 Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege]