Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Actualism and Thisness', 'Letters to Jourdain' and 'Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong'

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17 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
12619 We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
8447 In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
8448 Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
12620 If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
12613 Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
16463 Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
12617 Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
12615 Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
6650 Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618 It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12614 I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12621 Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622 Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
12623 The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
8446 We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
8449 Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
12616 English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]