Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Actualism and Thisness', 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' and 'Naturalizing the Mind'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M]
To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M]
Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M]