26 ideas
20339 | Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim] |
16463 | Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker] |
20338 | We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim] |
20342 | Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim] |
20343 | A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim] |
20348 | A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim] |
20347 | If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim] |
20345 | Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim] |
20331 | It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim] |
20336 | Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim] |
20337 | The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim] |
20333 | If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim] |
20334 | The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim] |
20335 | The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim] |
20340 | A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim] |
20341 | An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim] |
20332 | A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim] |
8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |