Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'The Theory of Objects' and 'Philosophy of Language'

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17 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
8250 So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
8719 There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
8971 There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong]
8718 Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
7756 Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
15781 The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3570 Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
2748 A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
7322 Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7325 Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7323 If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7328 The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
7329 Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]