36 ideas
19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |