Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Categories' and 'The Metaphysics within Physics'

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74 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle]
Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin]
The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle]
Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin]
Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin]
If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin]
The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff]
There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle]
The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle]
Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle]
Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin]
We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin]
If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin]
The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin]
If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin]
Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin]
Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin]