Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophical Explanations', 'Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I' and 'In Defence of Pure Reason'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
3695 Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
3651 Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
3700 Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
15924 Predicative definitions are acceptable in mathematics if they distinguish objects, rather than creating them? [Zermelo, by Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17608 We take set theory as given, and retain everything valuable, while avoiding contradictions [Zermelo]
17607 Set theory investigates number, order and function, showing logical foundations for mathematics [Zermelo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10870 ZFC: Existence, Extension, Specification, Pairing, Unions, Powers, Infinity, Choice [Zermelo, by Clegg]
13012 Zermelo published his axioms in 1908, to secure a controversial proof [Zermelo, by Maddy]
17609 Set theory can be reduced to a few definitions and seven independent axioms [Zermelo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
13017 Zermelo introduced Pairing in 1930, and it seems fairly obvious [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
13015 Zermelo used Foundation to block paradox, but then decided that only Separation was needed [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
13020 The Axiom of Separation requires set generation up to one step back from contradiction [Zermelo, by Maddy]
13486 Not every predicate has an extension, but Separation picks the members that satisfy a predicate [Zermelo, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
13487 In ZF, the Burali-Forti Paradox proves that there is no set of all ordinals [Zermelo, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
18178 For Zermelo the successor of n is {n} (rather than n U {n}) [Zermelo, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
13027 Zermelo believed, and Von Neumann seemed to confirm, that numbers are sets [Zermelo, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
9627 Different versions of set theory result in different underlying structures for numbers [Zermelo, by Brown,JR]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
3697 The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3570 Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
3707 Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour]
3704 Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
3706 A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour]
3696 A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour]
3703 You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3699 The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3701 Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 4. Tracking the Facts
2748 A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
3702 Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
3709 Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
3708 All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3698 Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour]