14 ideas
| 23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
| 23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
| 6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
| 23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
| 23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
| 23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
| 23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
| 23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
| 23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
| 3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
| 3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
| 2748 | A true belief isn't knowledge if it would be believed even if false. It should 'track the truth' [Nozick, by Dancy,J] |
| 23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
| 23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |